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SILENCED BY INSTRUCTION 
Vida B. Johnson* 
ABSTRACT 
Criminal law and procedure tell us a criminal defendant is presumed 
innocent. Jurors in criminal trials receive a specific instruction on the 
presumption of innocence prior to beginning deliberations in trial. But the 
instructions given to the jury in a number of jurisdictions when a defendant 
testifies is a significant legal obstacle standing in the way of the presumption of 
innocence. Jurors in a few states and federal courts all over the country receive 
instructions that a defendant’s testimony should be viewed with caution because 
of his interest in the outcome of the case. In other states the general instructions 
about assessing credibility of all witnesses asks courts to consider the witnesses 
“interest in the outcome of the case.” Since no one has a clearer or more 
apparent interest in the outcome of the case than the defendant, any type of 
instructions that highlights an interest in the outcome of the case undermines 
the presumption of the innocence is a significant infringement on his 
constitutional right. Despite the presumption of innocence, jurors are told when 
a person accused of a crime proclaims his innocence in the courtroom, that 
testimony should be viewed with skepticism. This Article shows how these types 
of instructions work to silence defendants. The Article proposes a new jury 
instruction that should be given whenever an accused person testifies. 
  
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Cynthia Alkon, Jon 
Anderson, Yael Cannon, Daniel Harawa, Lucius Outlaw, Maneka Sinha, Kate Weisburd, and the participants of 
the 2019 Criminal Ethics Schmooze. Special thanks to Alexandra Douglas, DaNia Henry, and Sarah Miller for 
research help. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much of criminal law and procedure is ostensibly arranged around the ideal 
that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent. This animates the prohibition on 
shackles during trial and affords the accused the right not to wear prison garb in 
front of the jury. This presumption is the reason that the government may not 
introduce the defendant’s prior convictions or present evidence of bad character 
except in certain prescribed circumstances. Jurors in criminal trials receive a 
specific instruction on the presumption of innocence prior to beginning 
deliberations in trial. However, in a number of jurisdictions, the instructions 
given to the jury when a defendant testifies are a significant legal obstacle 
standing in the way of this presumption of innocence. Jurors in a few states and 
federal courts all over the country receive instructions that a defendant’s 
testimony should be viewed with caution because of his interest in the outcome 
of the case. In other states, the general instructions about assessing credibility of 
all witnesses ask courts to consider the witnesses’ “interest in the outcome of the 
case.” Since no one has a clearer or more apparent interest in the outcome of the 
case than the defendant, any type of instruction that highlights an interest in the 
outcome of the case undermines the presumption of the innocence and is a 
significant infringement on his1 constitutional rights. Put another way, despite 
the presumption of innocence, jurors are told when a person accused of a crime 
proclaims his innocence in the courtroom that testimony should be viewed with 
skepticism. 
As twenty-first century scholars reexamine our criminal legal system 
through the lens of mass incarceration, the criminal trial itself should be 
reexamined. There is a number of practices in the American criminal trial that 
unfairly disadvantage the accused. Of those individuals who choose to go to trial, 
only a small number decide to testify. A number of legal principles results in a 
silencing of defendants—the ability to impeach a defendant with his prior 
convictions, instructions that direct jurors to not hold it against a defendant when 
he remains silent, and a judge’s ability to sentence more harshly a defendant who 
testifies but is disbelieved.2 This Article adds to this discussion about the 
silencing of defendants by arguing that criminal jury instructions also contribute 
to the silencing of defendants and joins the chorus of those who are calling for 
more favorable practices and procedures to encourage defendants to testify. 
 
 1 While there is an increasing number of women who become involved in the criminal legal system, men 
are far more overrepresented. Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2020). At times, I will use masculine pronouns to refer to the 
criminally accused. 
 2 See infra notes 22, 56, 57, 108 and accompanying text. 
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These troubling jury instructions are yet another serious obstacle to fairness and 
contribute to the inequities of the criminal legal system on those ensnared in it. 
I have previously written about how the phenomenon of poorly understood 
jury instructions concerning the presumption of innocence and burden of proof 
should require voir dire on the topic to help identify jurors who cannot or will 
not follow those important legal principles.3 I have also argued previously that 
the police credibility instruction telling jurors to treat the testimony of a police 
officer like any other witness is unfair to the defense because it tells jurors to 
ignore the real biases inherent in law enforcement witnesses’ testimony.4 
Now, I propose a reconstruction of the jury instruction about the defendant’s 
testimony in all states to help strengthen the application of the presumption of 
innocence in criminal jury trials. All defendants in criminal cases enjoy the right 
to testify (as well as the right not to testify). Trial courts must stop highlighting 
through their jury instructions that defendants have a unique interest in the 
outcome of the case when they testify. Doing so undermines the inadequately 
understood instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of 
proof. Particularly, in cases where the accused would like to testify and the 
government’s main proof comes from law enforcement witnesses, the defendant 
is at a certain disadvantage that is inconsistent with his constitutional rights and 
does not square with the realities of our criminal legal system. 
An instruction more consistent with the burden and presumption of 
innocence is needed even in jurisdictions where a defendant’s testimony is not 
singled out during jury instructions. Trial judges should be instructing jurors to 
evaluate a defendant’s testimony just as they would any other witness. Jurors 
should also be told to keep in mind the presumption of innocence in evaluating 
the accused’s testimony and remember that the defendant’s testimony does not 
relieve the government of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jurors should be instructed to ask themselves whether the testimony of the 
defendant or any other defense witness gives them a reason to doubt the 
government’s case. Such an instruction could encourage more criminally 
accused persons to testify at trial and result in fairer outcomes. 
This Article will proceed in several parts. The first situates the importance 
of revisiting criminal jury instructions in the broader criminal legal reform 
 
 3 See Vida B. Johnson, Presumed Fair? Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of Our Criminal Justice System, 
45 SETON HALL L. REV. 545 (2015). 
 4 See Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer 
Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017). 
JOHNSON_12.2.20 12/2/2020 12:53 PM 
2020] SILENCED BY INSTRUCTION 313 
movement. Part II explains the role the presumption of innocence purports to 
play in our criminal legal system. Part III explains jury instructions generally 
and specifically addresses the instructions given to jurors when the defendant 
testifies and general credibility instructions, and contrasts those with police 
officer testimony instructions. Part IV explores how the law works to discourage 
testimony by defendants and how jury instructions play a role in this silencing 
of defendants. The Article concludes with solutions, including a proposed new 
instruction that courts should give when an accused person testifies. 
I. SITUATING THE ISSUE IN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL REFORM MOVEMENT 
As the nation struggles to dismantle mass incarceration, the system is being 
reimagined by many scholars and activists. Some have called for complete 
decarceration.5 Criminal justice reformers have tackled some of the more 
obvious injustices in the American system. Specialty courts have diverted some 
defendants from jail by recognizing the role of addiction and mental health in 
some jurisdictions.6 Decriminalization and legalization of marijuana has helped 
individuals traditionally targeted by police and prosecutors avoid convictions 
and the repercussions that come from drug convictions.7 The First Step Act, 
passed in 2019, focused its reforms on inhumanity in federal prisons.8 These 
steps, while worthwhile, will not end mass incarceration. 
More steps to overhaul the criminal legal system must be taken. One legal 
scholar recently opined that if reform continues at its current pace, it would take 
seventy-five years just to cut our prison population in half.9 Everything from 
shrinking police forces, and what and who is prosecuted must be scrutinized. 
 
 5 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Atwater and the Misdemeanor Carceral State, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 
147, 149, 155–57 (2020); Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. 1597, 1599, 1604–05 (2017); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might 
Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-
abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html; Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 1156, 1172 (2015); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1615 
(2015); Dean Spade, The Only Way to End Racialized Gender Violence in Prisons Is to End Prisons: A Response 
to Russell Robinson’s “Masculinity as Prison”, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 182, 193 (2012). 
 6 See generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MUNICIPAL COURTS: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR 
DIVERTING PEOPLE WITH MENTAL AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(2015), https://store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/sma15-4929.pdf. 
 7 See Drug Decriminalization, DRUG POL’Y ALL., https://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/drug-
decriminalization (last visited Nov. 19, 2020). 
 8 Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, 128 Yale L.J. F. 791, 812–
14 (2019). 
 9 Campbell Robertson, Crime Is Down, Yet U.S. Incarceration Rates Are Still Among the Highest in the 
World, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/us-mass-incarceration-rate.html 
(quoting Rachel Barkow: “If we keep working on the kinds of criminal justice reforms that we’re doing right 
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It has been pointed out by many, including our Supreme Court, that we no 
longer have a system of trials but a system of pleas.10 There are myriad 
consequences of conviction that are faced by those ensnarled in the system.11 
The most obvious of course is jail or prison time. But courts and reformers have 
focused not only on that serious consequence but also on the additional collateral 
consequences of conviction.12 Everything from deportation, job loss, 
homelessness, to loss of a government pension can be the result of conviction.13 
This, of course, makes it very difficult for a person to reintegrate into their 
community after a conviction.14 
Once a case has been brought to court, apart from diversion programs and 
dismissals, the only path that avoids consequences of conviction is an acquittal 
at trial. But to win at trial means that cases need to be set for trial and not pleaded 
out. Despite facing jail time and the other serious consequences of conviction, 
many still take pleas offered to them by the government rather than go to trial.15 
 
now, it’s going to take us 75 years to reduce the [prison] population by half.”). 
 10 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the 
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (highlighting “the reality that criminal justice today is 
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (“[W]e 
have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 11 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 (noting that “the ‘drastic measure’ of deportation or removal . . . is now 
virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes”) (citation omitted); MARGARET 
COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA M. KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 1.2 (2013). 
 12 See, e.g., ZACHARY HOSKINS, BEYOND PUNISHMENT?: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE COLLATERAL 
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION (2019); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW 
OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 28, 30, 32, 
34–35 (2018); Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal Procedure, 54 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 10, 62 (2019); Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1031, 1033, 1037, 1039–40 (2020); see also About CCRC, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/about-the-collateral-consequences-resource-center/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2020). 
 13 See Murray, supra note 12, at 1032, 1045; A.B.A., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK 5 (2018); JOHN G. MALCOLM & JOHN-MICHAEL SEIBLER, COLLATERAL 




 14 See MALCOLM & SEIBLER, supra note 13, at 12 (“[C]ollateral consequences that are applied 
indiscriminately, with a tenuous relationship between the restriction imposed and the offense committed, can 
make it more difficult for someone with a criminal record to reintegrate into society[.]”). 
 15 See Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATL. MONTHLY (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ (reporting that approximately 94% of state felony 
convictions and 97% of federal felony convictions are the result of plea bargains); John H. Blume & Rebecca 
K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 163 
(2014) (reporting that over 96% of all criminal cases were resolved by plea bargain between 2008 and 2012). 
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Some estimate that around 10% of the innocent take guilty pleas.16 If individuals 
think that the risks of trial are too great, then that must also mean that individuals 
do not perceive their chances at trial to be high, even when they are innocent.17 
That participants do not think they are treated fairly calls into question the 
integrity and harshness of the system if even the innocent are too afraid of the 
system to participate fully. 
Between innocent people pleading guilty, the slow rate of reform, and the 
dearth of programs that would allow people to avoid conviction, the criminal 
trial itself demands scrutiny. Defendants convicted at trial contribute to our 
carceral system. But, with a small percentage of convictions that are a result of 
a trial as opposed to a plea, convictions at trial represent only a small fraction of 
people who end up in state and federal prison. Of course, some people take plea 
offers rather than go to trial because they feel they will not get a fair shake at 
trial whether they are guilty or innocent.18 These are legitimate fears, especially 
for poor people of color.19 There are many reasons to be concerned about 
outcomes at trial for criminal defendants. 
There are a number of ways in which criminal trials are unfair to defendants. 
Discovery rules,20 the impeachment of criminal defendants with prior 
 
 16 See NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 17 (2018) (estimating “that anywhere from 1.6% to 
27% of defendants who plead guilty may be factually innocent”); Why Do Innocent People Plead Guilty to 
Crimes They Didn’t Commit?, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.guiltypleaproblem.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 
2020) (“18% of known exonerees pleaded guilty to crimes they didn’t commit[.]”); see also Yoffe, supra note 
15. 
 17 See Blume & Helm, supra note 15, at 172–80 (explaining three primary reasons for innocent defendants 
to plead guilty). 
 18 See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (theorizing that an innocent 
defendant with limited resources may plead guilty because he realizes that “his chances of mounting an effective 
defense at trial may be modest at best”). 
 19 See Jeanette Hussemann & Jonah Siegel, Pleading Guilty: Indigent Defendant Perceptions of the Plea 
Process, 13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459, 473–75 (2019); Stephen B. Bright, Rigged: When Race and Poverty 
Determine Outcomes in the Criminal Courts, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 263, 265–66, 270, 273–76 (2016). 
 20 See, e.g., Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 779–81 
(2017) (discussing defendants’ limited rights under the traditional criminal discovery framework and analyzing 
the potential impact of open-file discovery reform); Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt 
You: Knowledge, Access, and Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3, 11, 12 (2015) (critiquing the 
rule that prosecutors have “no obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence when the defendant ‘knew or should 
have known’ about the ‘essential facts’ of the exculpatory material”); Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, 
Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 
166 (2012) (same); Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 982 (2008) (“[A]lthough criminal discovery is the primary mechanism though which 
the government reveals its evidence, the rules provide at best a narrow window through which defendants—and 
potentially the public—may glimpse the workings of the official information-gathering machine.”); Mary 
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convictions,21 inequities in the resources of court-appointed lawyers,22 
overzealous prosecutors who fail to turn over exculpatory material before and 
during trial,23 purposeful and unconscious racism24 by all players in the system, 
 
Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
541, 543, 545, 549 (2006) (examining how defendants’ limited access to discovery substantially affects the 
reliability of criminal trial outcomes); Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some 
New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 239–41 (2005) (discussing 
how United States v. Ruiz erodes prosecutors’ duty to disclose under Brady); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen 
Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 
(2002); Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery 
in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1106 (1991). 
 21 See Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 2002–04, 2009–14 (2016). 
 22 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and No Time, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-defender-case-loads.html; 
John Pfaff, Why Public Defenders Matter More Than Ever in a Time of Reform, APPEAL (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://theappeal.org/why-public-defenders-matter-more-than-ever-in-a-time-of-reform-9b018e2184fe/ 
(“[T]here is no doubt that . . . public defenders . . . are underfunded — both in absolute terms, and compared to 
far better-funded prosecutor offices.”); Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 121–25 (E. Luna ed., 2017); Irene 
Oritseweyinmi Joe, Systematizing Public Defender Rationing, 93 DENV. L. REV. 389, 392 (2016); Vida B. 
Johnson, A Plea for Funds: Suing Padilla, Lafler, and Frye to Increase Public Defender Resources, 51 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 403, 404, 423 (2014); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 3 (2004), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp
_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 23 See, e.g., Kate E. Bloch, Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct, 32 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14–15, 17–18, 23–24 (2019); Vida B. Johnson, Federal Criminal Defendants out of the Frying 
Pan and into the Fire? Brady and the United States Attorney’s Office, 67 CATH. U. L. Rev. 321, 337, 341–44 
(2018); Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and the Prosecutorial 
Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 25–29, 36 (2013); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1543–44 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games 
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 541–42 (2007); Cerruti, supra note 20, at 239–42 (discussing 
how United States v. Ruiz erodes prosecutors’ duty to disclose under Brady); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial 
Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2005) (arguing 
that even good prosecutors err on the side of non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence); Sundby, supra note 20, 
at 653–54 (2002). 
 24 See, e.g., POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (Angela J. Davis 
ed., 2017); NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST 
CRIMINAL COURT (2016); Christian B. Sundquist, Uncovering Juror Racial Bias, 96 DENV. L. REV. 309, 323–
24 (2019); Anna Roberts, Implicit Jury Bias: Are Informational Interventions Effective?, in CRIMINAL JURIES IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 85 (Cynthia J. 
Najdowski & Margaret C. Stevenson eds., 2019); David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in 
Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1886, 1889–90 (2018); Christi Metcalfe & Ted Chiricos, Race, Plea, and 
Charge Reduction: An Assessment of Racial Disparities in the Plea Process, 35 JUST. Q. 223, 228 (2018); Justin 
D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical Study of Judicial 
Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 83–85, 96, 104, 111 (2017); L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit 
Racial Bias in the Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 867, 870, 876 (2017); Mark W. Bennett, The Implicit 
Racial Bias in Sentencing: The Next Frontier, 126 YALE L.J. F. 391, 395, 400, 402–03 (2017); Justin D. 
Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F. 406, 409, 411 (2017); Jessica Blakemore, 
Implicit Racial Bias and Public Defenders, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833, 836–38 (2016); William Y. Chin, 
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and unchecked racial discrimination in jury selection25 are just some of the 
practices that unfairly injure the criminally accused and contribute to defendants 
avoiding trial and accepting plea bargains. 
We know that jurors ignore or fail to understand critical criminal jury 
instructions, even about the legal standards of the presumption of innocence and 
the burden of proof.26 The jurisdictions that have jury instructions that are hard 
to understand27—and the jurisdictions that do not allow voir dire on the topic28—
disadvantage all criminal defendants because jurors are not adequately applying 
the legal standards essential to a fair trial. 
Another unfairness in the American criminal legal system is about credibility 
instructions given to jurors. There is an unfairness in giving misleading criminal 
jury instructions about police officers’ lack of bias even when they have an 
interest in the outcome of the case—like in an undercover sting case.29 Criminal 
trial judges across the country tell jurors to treat the testimony of police officers 
just like the testimony of any other witness.30 But when it comes to the testimony 
of the accused—who the jury will also be told is presumed innocent—those 
same jurors are often told that he has an interest in the outcome of the case and 
his testimony should be received with caution.31 
 
Racial Cumulative Disadvantage: The Cumulative Effects of Racial Bias at Multiple Decision Points in the 
Criminal Justice System, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 441, 443, 457 (2016); Hon. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., 
Judges, Racism, and the Problem of Actual Innocence, 57 ME. L. REV. 481, 484, 487–88 (2005). 
 25 See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1624–25 (2018); Vida 
B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 387, 400, 402–03, 414 (2016); Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 31, 34 (2014); Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges By Prosecutors, 
27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163, 1172–73 (2014); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 1467, 1477–80 (2012); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 
1552, 1554 (2012); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 150 (2010); Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 218, 228–29, 235 (2005). 
 26 Johnson, supra note 3, at 556–57. 
 27 See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 449, 455, 457–58, 464, 467, 473 (2006) (examining lack of jury instruction reform despite evidence that 
jury instructions are ineffective); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of 
Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1085–88 (2001). 
 28 Michael L. Neff, In Defense of Voir Dire: Legal History and Social Science Demand Appropriate Voir 
Dire, 17 GA. BAR J. 14, 15 (2011) (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“Every party is 
entitled to ‘present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.’”)). 
 29 Johnson, supra note 4, at 250. 
 30 Id. at 256. 
 31 See, e.g., Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 304–05 (1895) (“The deep personal interest which 
[the defendant] may have in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence and 
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This stark dichotomy of courts ignoring the bias of police officers while 
highlighting the bias of the defendant only amplifies and compounds an already 
unfair power imbalance in our criminal legal system. The police have 
tremendous power in comparison to defendants who have virtually none. The 
defense has only seemingly meaningless ideals of the system that are unexecuted 
through this disparity. Prosecutors and judges have a role in addressing injustices 
in our system. Indeed, judges are supposed to enforce the constitutional rights 
of the accused and prosecutors are supposed to “seek justice.”32 When those 
parties fail to act, criminal defense attorneys can take action by litigating this 
issue in their cases both at the trial level by requesting alternate instructions and 
at the appellate level when they are unsuccessful. 
Jurors are not informed of all of these inequities in the criminal legal system 
against criminal defendants or people of color who are prosecuted. No jury 
instruction or introduction from the judge gives jurors the background that could 
rectify the many imbalances against the criminally accused. And jurors who are 
familiar with those injustices may be stuck from a jury.33 With no guidance from 
the trial judges, these inequities only become more entrenched and unfair at trial. 
II. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
The presumption of innocence is “a basic component of a fair trial under our 
system of criminal justice,”34 and the history of the presumption of innocence 
has been “traced . . . from Deuteronomy through Roman law, English common 
law, and the common law of the United States.”35 The Supreme Court has also 
noted that the presumption of innocence “cautions the jury to put away from 
their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the 
arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence 
adduced.”36 Our system hinges on this ideal. 
 
in determining how far, or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit.”). 
 32 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, STANDARD 3-1.2 (A.B.A. 4th 
ed. 2017) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to 
convict.”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative 
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); EVAN BERNICK, ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE 
COURTS PERFORMED IN 2015–2016 (2016). 
 33 See Abbie Vansickle, You Can Get Kicked Out of a Jury Pool for Supporting Black Lives Matter, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 7, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/07/you-can-get-kicked-out-of-
a-jury-pool-for-supporting-black-lives-matter. 
 34 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); see Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 479 (1978). 
 35 Taylor, 436 U.S. at 483. 
 36 Id. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)). 
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The presumption of innocence is first and foremost a trial right.37 Because 
of the importance of this right, a number of safeguards has been created to 
enforce it. Jurors do not hear about an accused person’s prior conviction because 
of the presumption of innocence.38 The right of detained defendants not to be 
handcuffed or shackled before a jury39 or to wear civilian clothes in front of a 
jury40 are some examples of additional efforts to safeguard the rights of the 
criminally accused. Evidently, the Supreme Court has made it clear that trial 
courts have an obligation to take steps to ensure that criminal defendants receive 
the benefit of the presumption of innocence and that the government is held to 
its burden.41 Trial courts across the country make sure to instruct sitting jurors 
in criminal trials that the accused is presumed innocent, and many jurisdictions 
ask about prospective jurors’ understanding and ability to abide by that core 
legal principle.42 
The presumption of innocence is so important that recent reformist 
arguments against pre-trial cash bail are often framed as an assault on the 
presumption of innocence43 because it imposes detention on those whom the law 
is supposed to consider innocent.44 And, unsurprisingly, jurors are less likely to 
convict defendants whom they can see at liberty than those who are detained.45 
 
 37 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1979). 
 38 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“Evidence of prior convictions 
has been forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of innocence of the crime currently charged.”). 
 39 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 627 (2005) (reasoning that it was error to shackle and handcuff 
defendant for the penalty phase of his capital trial). 
 40 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). 
 41 See Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575; Deck, 544 U.S. at 627; Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503. 
 42 See, e.g., 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
§ 1.102 (MB rev. ed. 2020): 
“Every defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption of innocence remains with 
the defendant throughout the trial unless and until s/he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden 
is on the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden of proof never 
shifts throughout the trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his/her innocence or to produce any 
evidence. If you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of [the] [a 
particular] offense with which the defendant is charged, it is your duty to find him/her guilty [of that offense]. 
On the other hand, if you find that the government has failed to prove any element of [the] [a particular] offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty [of that offense].” 
 43 See ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1143 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that Harris 
County’s money bail policy implicates “fundamental constitutional guarantees,” including the presumption of 
innocence). 
 44 See, e.g., Scott Shackford, Innocent Until Proven Guilty, But Only if You Can Pay, REASON (2018), 
https://reason.com/2018/07/14/innocent-until-proven-guilty-b/; James A. Allen, Making Bail: Limiting the Use 
of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning of Excessive Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 640, 656, 680 
(2017); R.A. Duff, Pre-Trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 128 (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013); Shima Baradaran, 
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 754 (2011). 
 45 See RAM SUBRAMANIAN, RUTH DELANEY, STEPHEN ROBERTS, NANCY FISHMAN & PEGGY MCGARRY, 
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Defense counsel may argue during closing about the presumption of 
innocence, but a defense attorney’s statements about the law are no substitute 
from hearing about this legal standard from the judge himself. Jurors may see 
defense counsel as an advocate hired by the accused or appointed by the state. 
That role is far less esteemed than that of the judge—the neutral arbiter of the 
law. Instructions about the presumption of innocence from a judge are essential. 
There is no denying the importance of the presumption of innocence on the 
criminally accused. It should permeate the criminal trial. However, there are few 
instances in which a jury sees or hears about the presumption. Apart from the 
fact that detained defendants can wear court attire or when defendants at liberty 
are seen outside the courtroom, the jury instructions are the only instances in 
which the jury hears or sees anything about the presumption. Often, the jury 
instructions come only at the end of a trial after the jurors have received and 
synthesized the testimony and evidence.46 And the instructions about the 
defendant’s testimony undermine the jury’s consideration of his testimony and 
the presumption of innocence. Ridding trial courts of jury instructions that 
undermine the presumption of innocence should be something for which all 
stakeholders in the criminal legal system should advocate. 
If the presumption of innocence is not adequately understood by jurors 
during a trial, then the accused person is denied something that was promised to 
him by the very system in which he is ensnared. 
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Jury instructions are the legal principles that jurors are instructed by the 
judge to follow. So, while the jurors are supposed to find facts, the trial judge 
tells them what law to apply to those facts through the jury instructions.47 
 
INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 14 (2015), https://www.vera.org/downloads/ 
publications/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf (noting research indicating that “jurors tend to view 
defendants brought to court in jail uniforms and shackles as guilty regardless of the merits of the case”); Jeffrey 
Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1972 
(2005) (“Numerous empirical studies have suggested that the longer a person spends time in pretrial detention, 
the more likely she will be convicted and the more likely that the sentence will be severe.”). 
 46 Some courts address the presumption of innocence in preliminary instructions while others do not. See 
Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors’ Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and Timing of Jury 
Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1715 (2015) (explaining that “juries in criminal trials generally receive the 
bulk of jury instructions after they hear evidence”); Neil P. Cohen, Symposium, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 
67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 688, 694 (2000). 
 47 Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury 
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (noting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Sparf & Hansen v. United States “solidified the importance of jury instructions, for 
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Virtually every jurisdiction gives at least some instructions as to the law in 
criminal and civil jury trials.48 
While the role of jury instructions is important to understand, it should also 
be noted before delving further that these legal instructions are notoriously 
misunderstood by jurors.49 This phenomenon exists for a number of different 
reasons including the manner in which jury instructions are delivered,50 the 
timing of their delivery,51 and the education and comprehension level of jurors 
as compared to the level at which the legal instructions are written.52 As will be 
discussed later, the fact that instructions are poorly understood may 
disadvantage the criminal defendant. 
In some jurisdictions, preliminary jury instructions are given before opening 
statements.53 All jurisdictions offer instructions at the close of evidence and 
 
if jurors did not have the right to decide legal issues, the trial judge had to give the jury instructions so that the 
jurors could apply the appropriate law to the facts they found”); How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, A.B.A. 
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_ 
network/how_courts_work/juryinstruct/ (“The judge instructs the jury about the relevant laws that should guide 
its deliberations. . . . [J]urors determine the facts and reach a verdict, within the guidelines of the law as 
determined by the judge.”). 
 48 Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, State Jury Instructions on the Web, 81 MICH. BAR J. 46, 46–48 (2002). 
 49 Cortney E. Lollar, Punitive Compensation, 51 TULSA L. REV. 99, 134 (2015); Robert Rich, The Most 
Grotesque Structure of All: Reforming Jury Instructions, One Misshapen Stone at a Time, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 819, 823–26 (2011); Molly Armour, Comment, Dazed and Confused: The Need for a Legislative 
Solution to the Constitutional Problem of Juror Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 641, 652–
55 (2008); Peter M. Tiersma, Toward More Understandable Jury Instructions: The California Experience, 21 
CRIM. JUST. 5, 6 (2006); John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid 
Criminal Juror Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1196–97, 1199, 1201–02, 1207–08 (2002). 
 50 See, e.g., Blake M. McKimmie, Emma Antrobus & Chantelle Baguley, Objective and Subjective 
Comprehension of Jury Instructions in Criminal Trials, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 163, 167, 172–73 (2014) (finding 
that jury instructions are written to focus on jurors’ objective, rather than subjective, understanding, and 
subjective understanding is vital to comprehension of the instruction); Rich, supra note 49, at 824–25 (2011); 
Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. 
REV. 701, 702 (2000) (noting that when jurors indicate confusion about an instruction, judges may simply re-
read the instruction and are not obligated to fix the miscomprehension issue). 
 51 See Ingriselli, supra note 46, at 1729–30 (finding that giving instructions before evidence leads to 
reduced biases); Marder, supra note 27, at 498–99; Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . But the Words 
Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption That Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 198 (2004); 
William Erickson, Criminal Jury Instructions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 285, 291–92 (1993). 
 52 See Lollar, supra note 49, at 134 (2015); Bettina E. Brownstein, It’s Time to Make Jury Instructions 
Understandable, 37 ARK. LAW. 24, 25 (2002); Cronan, supra note 49, at 1207–10. 
 53 See Ingriselli, supra note 46, at 1715 n.103 (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 18.6(c)) (“Immediately after the 
jury is sworn, the court shall instruct the jury concerning its duties, its conduct . . . and the elementary legal 
principles that will govern the proceeding.”); Cohen, supra note 46, at 688–92; see also HON. GREGORY E. MIZE, 
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, THE STATES-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT 
EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 36–37 (2007), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/ 
5623/soscompendiumfinal.pdf (finding that eight states “require judges to pre-instruct jurors on the substantive 
law before the evidentiary portion of the trial”). For example, the District of Columbia’s criminal jury 
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before deliberations begin—before or after closing statements.54 And of course 
because few things can be defined prior to hearing evidence, even where 
instructions are given both at the beginning and the end of evidence, the final 
instructions are the longest.55 Instructions can take a significant period of time. 
Some judges give written copies of those instructions to take back to the jury 
room to have with them during deliberations.56 Other judges allow note-taking 
by jurors during instruction, and some allow neither.57 Jurors are presumed to be 
able to understand instructions despite little evidence that this is true.58 
In a criminal trial, jurors receive instruction on everything from the charges 
the defendants is facing; legal defenses like alibi; identification; self-defense; 
various theories of liability like accomplice, aider, and abettor; accessory, 
conspiracy, and other legal principles like constructive possession; and, of 
course, the legal standards to apply.59 These instructions serve to help jurors 
understand the legal principles they are presumed to follow. 
 
instructions read: 
Every defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption of innocence 
remains with the defendant throughout the trial unless and until s/he is proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The burden is on the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and that burden of proof never shifts throughout the trial. The law does not 
require a defendant to prove his/her innocence or to produce any evidence. If you find that the 
government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of [the] [a particular] offense 
with which the defendant is charged, it is your duty to find him/her guilty [of that offense]. On 
the other hand, if you find that the government has failed to prove any element of [the] [a 
particular] offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty [of that 
offense]. 
1 BERGMAN, supra note 42. 
 54 See Cohen, supra note 46, at 694; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(c) (providing that the court “may instruct 
the jury before or after the arguments are completed, or at both times”). 
 55 See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to 
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77 (1988) (“At the end of the trial the judge provides the jury with lengthy 
instructions explaining the law applicable to the case and directing the jurors to find the facts in accordance with 
certain legal definitions and instructions.”); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 
69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 83 (1990). 
 56 See Nancy S. Marder, Jury Reform: The Impossible Dream, 5 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 149, 159–62 (2009); 
Peter Tiersma, Asking Jurors to Do the Impossible, 5 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 105, 123 (2009) (explaining that while 
experts recommend jurors receive copies of the instructions, some judges are prohibited from providing them). 
 57 Marder, supra note 56, at 162. 
 58 Diamond et al., supra note 47, at 1557 (finding that “[m]iscomprehension was the primary source of 
the instruction errors (83.2%),” and that language—“a word or phrase [that] . . . was an unfamiliar legal term” 
or a juror’s failure to apply plain language like and/or—was one of three key barriers in the rate of jury instruction 
comprehension). 
 59 See generally Different Types of Jury Instructions, LEGAL TRANSCRIPTION CO. (Nov. 13, 2015), 
https://www.legaltranscriptionservice.com/blog/2015/11/different-types-jury-instructions.html. 
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While jurors are supposed to find the facts, judges nevertheless instruct 
jurors on how to evaluate the evidence. Courts also comment on evidence in a 
number of ways—there are instructions about evidence of flight by the 
defendant and what weight to give circumstantial evidence.60 Most pattern 
instructions have a generic instruction about how to evaluate witness testimony 
that discusses a number of factors like memory, demeanor on the stand, and 
whether the witness has any bias.61 
Judges address the defendant’s right not to testify when an accused person 
makes the decision not to testify. These instructions tell jurors not to hold it 
against a defendant when he elects to remain silent at trial. The instructions 
essentially interpret the Fifth Amendment right to silence for the fact finders.62 
An instruction to this end is required if requested by the defense.63 Previously, 
jurors were allowed to take an adverse instruction when a defendant testified 
until the Court declared the practice (and prosecutors argued the same) 
unconstitutional in 1965.64 
Generally, jury instructions are legal, not factual. They should not invade the 
province of the jury.65 However, there are times when the judge comments on 
specific types of witnesses—expert witnesses, cooperating witnesses, witnesses 
with a plea agreement, child witnesses, the police officer witness and in many 
jurisdictions, the testimony of the defendant—and tells the jurors how to weigh 
that specific witness’ testimony.66 
 
 60 See 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 223, 372 (2017). 
 61 See, e.g., 1 BERGMAN, supra note 42, § 2.200: 
You may consider anything that in your judgment affects the credibility of any witness. For 
example, you may consider the demeanor and the behavior of the witness on the witness stand; 
the witness’s manner of testifying; whether the witness impresses you as a truthful person; 
whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate memory; whether the witness has any 
reason for not telling the truth; whether the witness had a meaningful opportunity to observe the 
matters about which he or she has testified; whether the witness has any interest in the outcome 
of this case, stands to gain anything by testifying, or has friendship or hostility toward other 
people concerned with this case. 
 62 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  
 63 See James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 342, 350 (1984); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). 
 64 See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. 
 65 See Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the Professionalization 
of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1020 (2006). 
 66 See, e.g., State v. Higgins, 518 A.2d 631, 637–38 (Conn. 1986) (upholding jury instruction on the 
defendant’s interest in the outcome of the case, where the trial court “also gave special instructions upon the 
credibility of accomplices, police officers and experts, who had testified for the state”). 
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A. The Defendant’s Testimony Instruction 
The jury instructions about the presumption of innocence can be 
significantly undermined when a defendant testifies if a judge gives a jury 
instruction that calls attention to the defendant’s interest in the case. It is 
undoubtedly true that a criminal defendant enjoys a presumption of innocence 
under our laws. But it is also true that any criminal defendant has an interest in 
whether he is acquitted or convicted. Because of this well-recognized bias, 
defendants historically did not have the right to testify.67 And, in some instances, 
even once they had the right to testify, defendants were not asked to swear an 
oath like other witnesses because it was assumed that falsehoods would follow.68 
States as diverse as Alabama, Arizona, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and 
New Mexico all allow these troubling instructions that tell jurors that the 
defendant has an interest in the outcome of the case when the defendant 
testifies.69 For example, the criminal jury instruction in the District of Columbia 
reads in part, “you may consider the fact that the defendant has [a vital] [an] 
interest in the outcome of his trial.”70 The Ninth Circuit has approved a jury 
instruction that directs the jury to consider the defendant’s “personal interest in 
the outcome of the case.”71 The Fifth Circuit has also approved an instruction 
that reads, in part, “you are entitled to take into consideration the fact that he is 
the defendant and the very keen personal interest that he has in the result of your 
verdict.”72 These are instructions highlighting bias that are only read when a 
defendant testifies. There are other states, discussed below, that highlight this 
bias, but place it in a general credibility of witness instruction rather than one 
specifically for the defendant.73 
 
 67 See Alexander G.P. Goldenberg, Interested, but Presumed Innocent: Rethinking Instructions on the 
Credibility of Testifying Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 745, 749 (2007). 
 68 Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused’s Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 454, 
464–65 (1962). 
 69 See, e.g., Hosch v. State, 155 So. 3d 1048, 1106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); People v. Brown, 141 P.2d 1, 
3–4 (Cal. 1943); State v. Kittell, 847 A.2d 845, 850–51 (R.I. 2004); Commonwealth v. Hunsinger, 549 A.2d 
973, 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); People v. Piedra, 87 A.D.3d 706, 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 70 1 BERGMAN, supra note 42, § 2.209. However, this instruction cannot be given over objection of the 
defense. Id. 
 71 United States v. Eskridge, 456 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 72 Nelson v. United States, 415 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 73 For example, Georgia recommends the following jury instructions: 
“The jury must determine the credibility of the witnesses. In deciding this, you may consider all of the facts and 
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, [their intelligence], their means and 
opportunity of knowing the facts about which they testify, the nature of the facts about which they testify, the 
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case, and 
their personal credibility as you observe it.” 
2 GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL § 1.31 (2020) 
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It was well over a hundred years ago that the United States Supreme Court 
in Reagan v. United States sanctioned an instruction that singled out the 
testimony of the accused, highlighting the defendant’s “deep personal 
interest.”74 In a District of Columbia federal district court case, the trial judge 
gave an instruction telling the jurors that the defendants had a “vital interest” in 
the outcome of the case.75 Relying on Reagan, the D.C. Circuit found no 
problem with the instruction, though the court did not appear to wrestle with the 
constitutional question, never once mentioning the presumption of innocence in 
the opinion.76 
These jury instructions about witness credibility that single out the testimony 
of the defendant no doubt cause confusion on the part of jurors. Jurors are 
instructed that the defendant is presumed innocent and then instructed that his 
testimony deserves careful scrutiny because he is the defendant. Jurors are 
essentially told that they should presume the defendant innocent but doubt him 
when he says so. 
In recognition of the presumption, not every court allows special instructions 
that comment on the interests of the defendant. The Third Circuit instructs jurors 
to treat the testimony just like that of any other witness.77 The Tenth Circuit also 
has a similar model instruction.78 
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided that trials courts will 
“refrain from instructing jurors, when a defendant testifies, that they may 
specifically consider his interest in the outcome of the case and the importance 
to him of the outcome of the trial.”79 The court did not find that the instruction 
undermined the presumption of innocence. While the instruction at issue in that 
case did single out the defendant, it also instructed the jury to “apply the same 
principles by which the testimony of other witnesses is tested.”80 The court went 
on to distinguish the instruction in its cases against one the Second Circuit had 
previously ruled was unconstitutional, where the trial court discussed the 
defendant’s “deep personal interest in the result of his prosecution.”81 
 
 74 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895). 
 75 United States v. Jones, 459 F.2d 1225, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 76 Id. at 1227. 
 77 COMM. ON MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS THIRD CIR., MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 
§ 4.28 (2018), http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2014%20Chapter%204%20final.pdf. 
 78 CRIM. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIR., 
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.08 (2011), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2018% 
20Chapter%204%20revisions%20final.pdf. 
 79 State v. Medrano, 65 A.3d 503, 508 (Conn. 2013). 
 80 Id. at 517. 
 81 Id. at 518–19. 
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In 2006, the Second Circuit took up a case in which a federal trial judge 
instructed the jury that the defendant’s bias gave him a motive to testify falsely.82 
Relying on the presumption of innocence the Second Circuit reversed the 
conviction and ruled that in future cases, jurors should not be instructed that the 
defendant has a “deep personal interest in the case,” but instead should be told 
to evaluate their testimony just like any other witness.83 The court wrote, 
This principle leads us to denounce any instruction, including the one 
at issue here, that tells a jury that a testifying defendant’s interest in 
the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify falsely. We do so 
not because the instruction is necessarily inaccurate[.] . . . But an 
instruction that the defendant has a motive to testify falsely 
undermines the presumption of innocence.84 
The Second Circuit got it right here. 
Despite the fact that many federal circuits and the State of Connecticut no 
longer allow these instructions, such instructions do still exist in some state trial 
courts as well as the District of Columbia.85 A number of states and federal 
circuits still allow these types of instructions.86 
The instruction highlighting the defendant’s testimony as different than 
other witnesses is justified by prosecutors and judges by the reality that the 
defendant does have an interest in the outcome of the case. Proponents of these 
instructions would argue that this truth should be imparted to jurors. However, 
there are many other truths about the criminal justice system that routinely get 
sanitized to comport with the presumption of innocence or other legal principles. 
We do not tell jurors about evidence suppressed pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment.87 With respect to the presumption of innocence we do not inform 
jurors about prior convictions (unless a defendant testifies) or other evidence of 
 
 82 U.S. v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 83 Id. at 245–49. 
 84 Id. at 246. 
 85 See, e.g., Castro v. United States, No. 04 CR. 664-2 TPG, 2013 WL 6508816, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 
2013) (“The defendant did not need to testify. But he did, and, now that he has testified, you will judge his 
credibility in the way that you judged the credibility of any witness.”); Medrano, 65 A.3d at 518 (“[T]he jury 
was to evaluate the defendant’s testimony in the same fashion as the testimony of the other witnesses.”); State 
v. Kittell, 847 A.2d 845, 850 (R.I. 2004); Givens v. State, 751 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Ga. 2013); State v. King, 897 
A.2d 543, 549 (Vt. 2006) (“The jury has the right to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, 
and this rule applies to the defendant as well as any other witness.” (citing State v. Camley, 438 A.2d 1131, 1134 
(Vt. 1981))); United States v. Patel, No. CRIM.A 06-60006, 2009 WL 1579526, at *16 (W.D. La. June 3, 2009) 
(recognizing “general instructions given to the jury which state, ‘The testimony of the defendant should be 
weighed and his credibility evaluated in the same way as that of any other witness’”). 
 86 See infra Appendix. 
 87 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–57 (1961). 
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crimes except in some prescribed circumstances.88 We do not inform jurors that 
the defendant was transported to the courthouse in restraints.89 We also sanitize 
bad behavior by police with instruction as well.90 For example, we do not tell 
jurors that police are allowed to stop citizens on pretexts or lie to elicit a 
confession.91 An instruction suggesting a defendant may lie simply because he 
is the defendant undermines fundamental fairness, as well as the presumption of 
innocence in criminal trials, and underscores a fact that simply should not be 
highlighted. 
For the most part, civil jury instructions do not highlight the bias of the 
parties. In a civil trial where money is at stake, for example, the plaintiff has an 
interest in winning the monetary damages, while the defendant has an interest in 
not losing the money.92 Trial judges do not instruct jurors on these interests.93 
The jury instructions about the defendant is closest to those given when 
convicted perjurers or cooperating witnesses testify in criminal trials.94 Because 
those witnesses’ credibility is in question because of obvious biases, a special 
instruction is given in the instances where they testify.95 For example, where a 
witness with a cooperation agreement testifies, the trial court will tell the jury 
that while the witness has the same obligation to tell the truth as other witnesses, 
the jury can consider whether the witness “has an interest different from other 
types of witnesses” and that her testimony should “be considered with 
 
 88 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 89 State v. Gonzalez, 120 P.3d 645, 647, 650 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding the trial court’s comment 
to the jury that the defendant was being held in jail because he could not post bail violated the defendant’s right 
to the presumption of innocence). 
 90 See Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other 
Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 500 (2011) (“[W]e will discover 
that existing policies on the admissibility of prior crimes evidence are deeply flawed, because either they are 
built upon a set off erroneous a priori assumptions about juror inferences or they ignore critical aspects of police 
and prosecutorial behavior.”). 
 91 See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Brenda Goodman, Prosecutors Say Corruption in Atlanta Police Dept. Is 
Widespread, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/us/27atlanta.html. 
 92 See infra Appendix. 
 93 See infra Appendix. 
 94 Compare United States v. Dunson, 142 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998) (“While instructing the jury, 
the district court told them an informant’s or immunized witness’ testimony should be considered with 
caution.”), with Walker v. United States, 982 A.2d 723, 740 (D.C. 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that “when the court instructed the jury that they could weigh [the defendant’s] testimony in light of his ‘interest 
in the outcome’ of the case, the court erred by singling him out”). 
 95 See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 215 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Although the judge thought an 
addict-informant instruction inadvisable, he did give an informant instruction, drawn from Instruction 3.13 of 
the Pattern Criminal Federal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit (1998), telling the jury that the testimony 
of any cooperating witness should be ‘considered with caution and great care.’”). 
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caution.”96 Those special instructions for interested parties are informed by a 
1952 Supreme Court case, On Lee v. United States.97 In On Lee, the Court wrote, 
The use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any 
of the other betrayals which are ‘dirty business’ may raise serious 
questions of credibility. To the extent that they do, a defendant is 
entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and 
to have the issues submitted to the jury with careful instructions.98 
It is from that language that many lower courts have drawn the right to issue 
special charges to the jury in informer cases.99 The fact these instructions 
highlight bias in a similar way to instructions about the accused’s testimony is 
troubling. Those other interested witnesses do not enjoy the right to be presumed 
innocent. In a case of a witness with a particular bias, current instructions in 
some jurisdictions would cause a juror to have a difficult time distinguishing 
how to evaluate the testimony of these types of witnesses, and run the risk that 
 
 96 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
CRIMINAL COMPANION HANDBOOK § 22.1 (2020); see United States v. Dunson, 142 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 
1998) (“While instructing the jury, the district court told them an informant’s or immunized witness’ testimony 
should be considered with caution.”); Austin, 215 F.3d at 752 (“Although the judge thought an addict-informant 
instruction inadvisable, he did give an informant instruction, drawn from Instruction 3.13 of the Pattern Criminal 
Federal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit (1998), telling the jury that the testimony of any cooperating 
witness should be ‘considered with caution and great care.’”); see also People v. Valdez, 53 A.D.3d 172, 179 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[T]he court gave the jury the standard instruction that the lieutenant’s testimony was 
to be given no more credence than that of any other witness simply because he was a police officer.”); State v. 
Marcisz, 913 A.2d 436, 442 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (Flynn, J., dissenting) (“Connecticut courts routinely instruct 
juries that they should evaluate the credibility of a police officer in the same way that they evaluate the testimony 
of any other witness, and that the jury should ‘neither believe nor disbelieve the testimony of a police official 
just because he is a police official.’”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 131 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he jurors were instructed at the end of the trial that they were not to view the credibility of law-
enforcement witnesses more favorably than other witnesses because of the officials’ occupation.”); State v. 
Morales, 10 P.3d 630, 634 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he trial court instructed the jurors . . . that they were the 
sole triers of witness credibility and that a police officer’s testimony ‘is not entitled to any greater or lesser 
weight or believability merely because of the fact that he is a police officer.’”); United States v. Cornett, 232 
F.3d 570, 576 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The court instructed the jury that they were the ‘sole judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses’ and that a police officer’s testimony ‘is neither more nor less entitled to belief than any other 
witness.’”); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 817 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (“It has been held that a jury should be 
given such instruction, when warranted, to the effect that a police officer is not, by virtue of that status, deemed 
to be more credible than any other witness, but, instead, his credibility and the weight to be given his testimony 
are to be judged upon the same standard as other witnesses’.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 97 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 98 On Lee, 343 U.S. at 757. 
 99 See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 886 A.2d 777, 789 (Conn. 2005); People v. Petschow, 119 P.3d 495, 504–
05 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. Grimes, 982 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Mont. 1999); State v. Moore, 981 A.2d 1030, 
1059–60 (Conn. 2009); State v. Dennis, 817 So. 2d 741, 751 (Fla. 2002); State v. Adams, 943 A.2d 851, 864 
(N.J. 2008); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701–02 (2004) (advising that the issue of an informant’s credibility 
be submitted “to the jury ‘with careful instructions’”). 
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they might lump defendants in with witnesses who do not enjoy the presumption 
and have significant credibility issues. 
The timing of instructions is also relevant to the issue of their fairness. When 
a defendant testifies, jurors often hear from the defendant last because the 
government’s burden requires that the prosecution must put on its case first.100 
So, the instructions about the testimony of all witnesses will be heard close in 
time to the accused’s testimony as opposed to the witness for the government 
who testify earlier. At least nine states have jury instructions about the 
defendant’s testimony that do not highlight any interest in the outcome of the 
case.101 Arizona’s instructions, for example, simply tell jurors to assess the 
credibility of the defendant’s testimony just like any other witness.102 These 
 
 100 Steps in a Trial: Opening Statements, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/openingstatements/. 
 101 See DEFENDANT AS WITNESS - IN GENERAL, ALASKA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL § 1.30 
(2012) (“The defendant has testified in this case. Judge [his][her] testimony in the same manner as you judge 
the testimony of any other witness.”); DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY, ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL, 
NO. 36 (1996) (“You must evaluate the defendant’s testimony the same as any witness’ testimony.”); WEIGHING 
THE EVIDENCE, 1 FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.9 (2019) (“The defendant in 
this case has become a witness. You should apply the same rules to consideration of [his] [her] testimony that 
you apply to the testimony of the other witnesses.”); DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS, HAWAII PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL § 3.15 (2020) (“The defendant in this case has testified. When a defendant testifies, 
his/her credibility is to be tested in the same manner as any other witness.”); CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT AS 
WITNESS, IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 302 (2010) (“If the defendant testifies, the Court should not 
give any instruction that specifically addresses the evaluation of the defendant’s credibility or testimony.”); JURY 
IS SOLE JUDGE OF THE BELIEVABILITY OF WITNESSES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 1.02 
(“You should judge the testimony of [ (a) (the) ] defendant[s] in the same manner as you judge the testimony of 
any other witness.”); DEFENDANT TESTIFIES, INDIANA PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NO. 13.2500 
(2019) (“You should judge the testimony of the Defendant as you would the testimony of any other witness.”); 
DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS - CRIMINAL § 51.160 (4th ed., 2020) (“The 
Committee recommends that there be no separate instruction given as to the defendant as a witness.”); DUTY OF 
JURY TO FIND FACTS: EVIDENCE, WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY, 17 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CRIMINAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3:4 (2019) (“You should judge the testimony of the defendant in the same manner as you 
judge the testimony of any other witness.”); CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS: IN GENERAL AND WHEN DEFENDANT 
TESTIFYING, 7 TENNESSEE PRACTICE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL § 42.04 (2019) (“The defendant 
having testified in [his] [her] own behalf, [his] [her] credibility is determined by the same rules by which the 
credibility of other witnesses is determined, and you will give [his] [her] testimony such weight as you may 
think it is entitled.”); DEFENDANT TESTIFYING, MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL, CR211A (2d 
ed.) (“The defendant testified at trial. Another instruction mentions some things for you to think about in 
weighing testimony. Consider those same things in weighing the defendant’s testimony. Don’t reject the 
defendant’s testimony merely because he or she is accused of a crime.”); DEFENDANT AS WITNESS, VERMONT 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1-5-311 (2019) (“(Def) has taken the stand and testified in this case. [He] [She] 
has a right to testify if [he] [she] decides to do so. You are to weigh [his] [her] testimony the same way you 
weigh the testimony of any other witness.”); CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, WISCONSIN JI-CRIMINAL (2000) (“The 
defendant has testified in this case, and you should not discredit the testimony just because the defendant is 
charged with a crime. Use the same factors to determine the credibility and weight of the defendant’s testimony 
that you use to evaluate the testimony of any other witness.”). 
 102 DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY, ARIZONA STANDARD CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS § 18(b) (2018) (“You must 
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instructions on their own do not offend the presumption of innocence. While on 
their own these instructions do not seem problematic, these instructions, when 
paired with certain other instructions about credibility, can still significantly 
undermine the presumption of innocence. 
We must critically ask why these instructions are given. Do they serve a 
legitimate purpose in a system with too few trials, few defendants testifying, and 
far too many people in prison? 
B. General Credibility Instructions 
In contrast, some states do not single out the defendant by name during 
instructions, but instead have instructions to aid the fact finder in evaluating the 
credibility of witnesses.103 Factors that might be useful in assessing credibility 
are emphasized during these sorts of instructions.104 These instructions ask 
jurors to keep in mind things like whether the witness seemed to have a good 
memory, the witness’s demeanor, and whether the witness has a good 
opportunity to observe.105 With respect to bias, some states just ask jurors to 
generically consider the interests or bias of the witnesses who testify. 
But other states go much further with their credibility instruction. Some 
states do not have instructions that are specific to the defendant’s testimony, but 
instead have instructions that allude to testimony of the defendant in the general 
instructions about credibility of witnesses. Colorado’s jury instructions, for 
example, talk about witnesses who will be affected by the verdict.106 Meanwhile, 
Florida asks jurors to consider whether the witness has “some interest in how 
the case should be decided.”107 Utah wants jurors to be thinking about whether 
the witness has “something to gain or lose from this case.”108 A number of states 
 
evaluate the defendant’s testimony the same as any witness’ testimony.”). 
 103 See, e.g., WITNESSES, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 105 (2020). 
 104 Id. (identifying fourteen factors for jurors to consider when evaluating the testimony of each witness 
without specifically addressing the defendant). 
 105 Id. 
 106 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL E:05 (2019) (“You are the 
sole judges of the credibility of each witness and the weight to be given to the witness’s testimony. You should 
carefully consider all of the testimony given and the circumstances under which each witness has 
testified. . . . Consider any relationship the witness may have to either side of the case, and how each witness 
might be affected by the verdict.”). 
 107 WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE, 1 FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.9 (2019) 
(“You should consider how the witnesses acted, as well as what they said. Some things you should consider 
are . . . [d]id the witness have some interest in how the case should be decided?”). 
 108 See, e.g., WITNESS CREDIBILITY, 2 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CR 207 (2020) (“In deciding 
this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was. Use your judgment and common sense. Let 
me suggest a few things to think about as you weigh each witness’s testimony . . . [d]oes the witness have 
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use similar language directing jurors to think about a witness’s “interest or lack 
of interest in the case.”109 
While instructions like these are certainly preferable to ones that single out 
the defendant in particular, these instructions still undermine the presumption of 
innocence. The presumption of innocence is undermined when a defendant 
testifies since these instructions emphasize the fact of an interest in the outcome 
of the case. There is no one more impacted by the outcome of the case than the 
defendant because the potential sentence and the collateral consequences of 
conviction can only apply to him.110 Naturally, in many instances, jurors must 
suppose that the judge is referring to the defendant’s testimony even if the 
instruction is not labeled in that way. 
Some states speak more generally about bias. Indiana’s instruction asks 
jurors to consider, “any interest bias or prejudice the witness may have.”111 An 
instruction along these lines is more evenhanded as it could apply to different 
players in the trial. While one juror may believe the instruction refers to the 
defendant, another may believe it applies to an informant or other witness. 
C. Police Officer Witness 
One type of witness has enjoyed the right to have his interests and biases 
ignored in every single jurisdiction in the country—the police officer witness. 
Fact finders are told that they should not give police officers’ testimony any 
greater or lesser weight than that of other witnesses they will hear from at trial.112 
 
something to gain or lose from this case?”). 
 109 See, e.g., EVALUATION OF TESTIMONY—CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, 2 NEBRASKA JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 5.2 (2016) (“You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight to be given to their testimony. In determining this, you may consider the following . . . [t]he interest or 
lack of interest of the witness in the result of this case[.]”); PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION, MONTANA JUDICIAL 
BRANCH, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMISSION, No. 1-103 (2009) (“You are the sole judges of the 
credibility, that is, the believability, of all the witnesses testifying in this case, and of the weight, that is, the 
importance, to be given their testimony. . . . You may consider . . . [w]hether the witnesses have an interest in 
the outcome of the case or any motive, bias or prejudice.”); EVALUATION OF TESTIMONY—BELIEVABILITY OF 
WITNESSES, 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CRIMINAL CRIMJIG 3.12 (6th ed.) (2019) 
(“In determining believability and weight of testimony, you may take into consideration the 
witness’s . . . [i]nterest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case[.]”). 
 110 See generally The Difference Between a Civil and Criminal Case, MISS. BAR, https://www.msbar.org/ 
for-the-public/consumer-information/the-difference-between-a-civil-and-criminal-case/ (last visited Nov. 19, 
2020) (describing the impacts and repercussions for a defendant in a criminal case). 
 111 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES—WEIGHING EVIDENCE, INDIANA PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
No. 1.1700 (2019). 
 112 Johnson, supra note 4, at 248. 
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In many criminal cases, however, police officers are not at all disinterested 
parties. In undercover buy-bust stings, search warrant cases, and assault on 
police officers cases, police officers are not only the only government witnesses 
to the alleged offense, but also the only testifying witness at trial, and they 
certainly are invested in the outcome of the case.113 These cases would not exist 
but for the police officer’s involvement. Some cases are created as a result of a 
police department’s interest. For example, police go out and act in an undercover 
capacity and claim to buy drugs or purchase sex because of the agendas that the 
police themselves or their offices have set.114 Later, they may have to justify 
decisions they made about the selective use of limited departmental resources 
with arrests and convictions. Convictions are later used to justify the choices 
made by the department.115 
In many instances, sting operations are often tied to police department 
budgets.116 Individual police departments often need to keep their arrest numbers 
up to justify their budgets.117 Some departments have arrest quotas they expect 
officers to make.118 So, officers go out to make arrests to comply with this goal. 
Millions of dollars recovered in certain types of cases can be seized by the police 
department and used for the department that recovered the funds.119 Individual 
officers’ jobs may depend on the existence of a department or operation. In 
addition to budgetary interests and crime creation, there are professional 
rewards, like promotions and raises for officers who are successful at their 
 
 113 Id. at 246, 250–51. 
 114 Id. at 250–51. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Jim Borden, Prostitution Stings to Fund Police Budget, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, http://blog.mlive.com/ 
kzgazette/2007/10/prostitution_stings_to_fund_po.html (last updated Apr. 5, 2019); Matt Gutman, Erin Brady, 
Seni Tienabeso & Candace Smith, How Undercover Cops in a Florida City Make Millions Selling Cocaine, 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/undercover-cops-florida-city-make-millions-
selling-cocaine/story?id=20523714; Lisa Getter & Mary Ann Esquivel, Some Cuts in Police Budget Restored, 
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 23, 1987, at 1B; Hector Castro, Glitches Hurt Effort To Fight Prostitution: Clerking Error 
Misdirected Money, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP., July 7, 2005, 2004 WLNR 3173805. 
 117 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 9–15 
(2015), https://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolice 
departmentreport.pdf. 
 118 Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the CompStat Era, 48 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543, 544–46 n.14 (2015) (citing Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 602 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (“Officers may be subject to warnings and more severe adverse consequences if they fail to 
achieve what their superiors perceive as appropriate enforcement activity numbers. . . . [A]n officer’s failure to 
engage in enough proactive enforcement activities could result in . . . adverse employment action.”). 
 119 Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/?utm_term=.7686 
cab7ea23; GOVERNING: THE FUTURE OF STATES & LOCALITIES, GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES, DIVERSITY 
ON THE FORCE: WHERE THE POLICE DON’T MIRROR COMMUNITIES 2 (2015), http://images.centerdigitaled.com/ 
documents/policediversityreport.pdf. 
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jobs.120 As an officer, success often means making arrests, especially where the 
arrests result in convictions.121 These are just some of the pressures that drive 
the operations of a police department. 
The potential for civil rights lawsuits and investigations into police officer 
testimony by internal affairs, and the issue of discipline, especially related to 
issues of physical force against civilians, give police officers additional 
motives.122 This is particularly true in assault-on-police-officer cases or any 
other case in which a defendant threatens physical force or where physical 
touching did in fact take place, whether or not an accused person makes the 
claim.123 
So, while police have any number of interests in a case, judges are instructing 
jurors to assume that the officer is just like an unbiased witness.124 So, even if 
the juror thinks that the mention of bias in a general credibility jury instruction 
applies to the officer, the judge explicitly tells him otherwise when he instructs 
him not to give the police officer’s testimony any greater or lesser weight simply 
because he is a police officer. 
While the officer’s interests might be brought out by a skilled defense 
attorney at trial during cross examination or in closing arguments, the jury will 
not hear about it from the judge. In fact, jurors will be told just the opposite from 
the court. The court will instruct the jury that the testimony of the officer should 
be received and evaluated just like that of any other witness—except the 
accused.125 In the same pre-deliberation instructions, the jury will be told that 
the defendant is biased and has a vital interest in the case and that the police 
officers have none.126 This is a particularly troubling dichotomy in a case where 
 
 120 See Jennifer Kastner, SDPD Officer Blows Whistle on ‘Rewards for Arrests’ Program, ABC 10 NEWS 
SAN DIEGO, https://www.10news.com/news/team-10/san-diego-police-officer-blows-whistle-on-rewards-for-
arrests-program (last updated Mar. 15, 2018). 
 121 See Saki Knafo, How Aggressive Policing Affects Police Officers Themselves, ATL. (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/aggressive-policing-quotas/398165/. 
 122 See Steve Reilly & Mark Nichols, Hundreds of Police Officers Have Been Labeled Liars, Some Still 
Help Send People to Prison, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/10/14/ 
brady-lists-police-officers-dishonest-corrupt-still-testify-investigation-database/2233386001/ (last updated Oct. 
17, 2019, 3:26 PM). 
 123 See Sa’id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems of Excessive Force Litigation, 25 
PAC. L.J. 171, 189 (1994). 
 124 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870–71 (6th Cir. 1992) (“People who are involved 
in law enforcement . . . [are] evaluated and judged by the same standard as anyone else.”). 
 125 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870–71 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 126 See, e.g., WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE, 1 FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § 3.9 (2019) 
(“You should consider how the witnesses acted, as well as what they said. Some things you should consider 
are . . . [d]id the witness have some interest in how the case should be decided?”). 
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it is the officer’s word against the defendant’s, and in many cases those parties 
are the only ones who truly know what happened.127 While their stakes in the 
case are certainly different, it is only the defendant who is to be presumed 
innocent of the accusation and entitled to constitutional protections.128 So, while 
the accused is entitled to the benefit the doubt, it is the police officer who 
actually receives it, despite the constitutional rights at stake. 
Of course, a prosecutor will also bring out the defendant’s bias during cross 
and closing arguments.129 But only the prosecutor will have the judge reading a 
jury instruction reinforcing his cross-examination and closing arguments about 
the defendant’s bias. The prosecuting attorney could even point to the instruction 
or mention that the judge will instruct them along the lines of his arguments.130 
Final instructions come after closing arguments, so the jurors will hear the 
court’s instructions about the defendant’s credibility just after receiving the 
prosecutor’s arguments.131 Jurisdictions that highlight a defendant’s bias with a 
special instruction run a significant risk that the jurors will assume that the judge 
sanctioned the prosecutors’ arguments about the defendant’s testimony and thus 
that the defendant’s testimony should not be believed. 
Similar arguments by defense counsel about police officer bias and 
credibility will not be accompanied by any judicial backup. Rather than 
receiving an instruction acknowledging the police officer’s bias, jurors are told 
to ignore it.132 
Placing criminal defendants at a disadvantage vis-à-vis government 
witnesses in the age of mass incarceration should not be acceptable. This 
inequity between how the testimonies of police officers and defendants is treated 
is no doubt exacerbated by racial bias—both conscious and implicit. Police 
officers tend to be whiter than the public at large,133 while criminal defendants 
 
 127 Wekili & Leus, supra note 123 (explaining that, in most cases, the police officer and the defendant are 
the only individuals who know what happened). 
 128 See Goldenberg, supra note 67, at 776–77 (noting the inconsistency between the presumption of 
innocence and instructions related to defendants’ self-interests). 
 129 Steps in a Trial: Cross Examination, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/crossexam/. 
 130 Steps in a Trial: Closing Arguments, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/closingarguments/. 
 131 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(c) (providing that the court “may instruct the jury before or after the arguments 
are completed, or at both times”). 
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 870–71 (6th Cir. 1992) (“People who are involved 
in law enforcement . . . [are] evaluated and judged by the same standard as anyone else[.]”). 
 133 GOVERNING: THE FUTURE OF STATES & LOCALITIES, supra note 119. 
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are overwhelmingly more likely to be people of color than is representative of 
the public at large.134 
Not only is the phenomenon of disparate credibility instructions for the 
defendant and police likely caused by bias, it reinforces it. White people are 
overrepresented on police forces and Black people are underrepresented.135 
Moreover, jurors are also more likely to be white.136 Individuals who are 
incarcerated or who have felony convictions are often barred from serving as 
jurors either permanently or for some period of time.137 Over 25% of adult 
African Americans have felony convictions, while only 6.5% of the total adult 
population has been convicted of a crime.138 Between the higher rates of felony 
conviction and incarceration, there is a disproportionately high number of 
African Americans who have been rendered unqualified for jury service in many 
states. And we know the representation by Black jurors is very important.139 
Studies have shown that all-white juries are more likely to convict Black 
defendants.140 
Research indicates that implicit bias permeates multiple aspects of the 
criminal legal system, including the selection of jurors,141 jurors’ interpretation 
 
 134 See, e.g., SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND 
RELATED INTOLERANCE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/; Radley Balko, 21 More 
Studies Showing Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/09/more-studies-showing-racial-disparities-criminal-
justice-system/?utm_term=.8b4750c40d1a. 
 135 Jeremy Ashkenas & Haeyoun Park, The Race Gap in America’s Police Departments, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/03/us/the-race-gap-in-americas-police-departments.html?search 
ResultPosition=8 (last updated April 8, 2015). 
 136 Ashish S. Joshi & Christina T. Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with Individual 
Consequences, A.B.A. (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/diversity-
inclusion/articles/2015/lack-of-jury-diversity-national-problem-individual-consequences/. 
 137 See James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for 
Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service, 36 LAW & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2014) (finding that Maine is the only 
state that does not place any restrictions “on a felon’s opportunity to serve as a juror”). 
 138 SARAH SHANNON, CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, MELISSA THOMPSON, JASON SCHNITTKER & MICHAEL 
MASSOGLIA, GROWTH IN THE U.S. EX-FELON AND EX-PRISONER POPULATION, 1948 TO 2010, at 7 (2011), 
http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687. 
 139 Joshi & Kline, supra note 136 (“[M]inority presence on a jury allows the group to understand and 
appreciate the different life experiences that different racial identities have with the criminal justice 
system. . . . Studies have shown that ‘diverse juries had longer deliberations, discussed more case facts, made 
fewer inaccurate statements, and were more likely to correct inaccurate statements.’”) (citations omitted). 
 140 See Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16 Percent More Often Than 
Whites, DUKE TODAY (Apr. 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/2012/04/jurystudy. 
 141 Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 25, at 1554. 
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of instructions on character evidence,142 and disproportionate conviction of 
Black defendants.143 Even instructions like character evidence, which are 
seemingly neutral, are at worst not immune to the implicit racial bias of jurors. 
The color-blind rationale of jury instructions on flight, character evidence, and 
defendants’ interest in the outcome of a case allows the personal stereotypes and 
prejudices against racial minorities that jurors may hold to enter the courtroom 
completely unchecked.144 In other words, color-blind instructions given to 
jurors, though intended to prevent racially-based unfair and unjust outcomes, 
actually enable jurors to make judgments based on unconscious or conscious 
racial stereotypes and biases about defendants, most often at the expense of 
Black defendants and defendants of color.145 
 There is so much structural racism built into our criminal legal system that 
jurors hardly need an excuse to disbelieve people of color accused of crimes 
compared to police officers, but trial judges are explicitly giving jurors one 
reason to do exactly that in their jury instructions. 
IV. SILENCING DEFENDANTS 
Several prominent scholars have sounded the alarm about how the criminal 
legal system silences defendants.146 Few defendants testify on their own behalf 
at trial.147 And as a result, in trial, the fact finder rarely hears from the defendant 
about the incident itself.148 Jury instructions that promote the credibility of police 
officer witnesses over that of the accused may contribute to the silencing of 
defendants in criminal cases. Our system should instead encourage the accused 
to testify at trial. 
There are good reasons for defendants to testify. As Barbara Babcock put it 
in 1993, “[i]t is almost impossible to see the defendant as a deserving person 
 
 142 Chris Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule 
404(b) Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5, 6, 11 (2007). 
 143 See SHANNON ET AL., supra note 138, at 7. 
 144 Goodman, supra note 142, at 5, 6 (illustrating how implicit racial bias and stereotypes about African 
American women with children may negatively sway a jury to convict such a woman of welfare fraud, regardless 
of actual evidence presented). 
 145 Id. at 13 (encouraging courts to “give those jurors the tools to fight the unconscious bias or unconscious 
racism that otherwise seeps into criminal trials where the defendant or witnesses are persons of color”). 
 146 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 408–10, 421, 423, 426, 433–34 
(2018); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U L. REV. 1449, 1453–
54, 1459–62, 1463–69 (2005). 
 147 Bellin, supra note 146, at 397 (“In modern times, only about half of criminal defendants take the 
witness stand.”). 
 148 Id. 
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unless he testifies, partly because the natural order of the trial dehumanizes 
him.”149 Jurors may believe that an “innocent person proclaims it from the 
rooftops.”150 But, despite the fact that defendants are more likely to win should 
they testify,151 there are significant ways in which the law discourages their 
testimony. In all but three states, prior convictions will be introduced against 
defendants for impeachment purposes.152 This means that during cross 
examination the prosecutor will ask the defendant about prior criminal 
convictions.153 This is allowed with the understanding that this area of cross 
examination is appropriate to show that the defendant’s testimony is not 
credible, not to demonstrate a disposition toward criminality.154 Defense 
attorneys worry that jurors consider this information against the defendants 
precisely as evidence of a general propensity to break the law.155 
In addition, should a defendant’s testimony be disbelieved and he be 
convicted, judges can and do consider the fact that the accused lied under oath 
at sentencing.156 Even when the defendant is not convicted of it, the judge can 
sentence him for the perjury the judge believes occurred during the defendant’s 
testimony at trial.157 The federal sentencing guidelines explicitly tell judges that 
they may consider that the defendant went to trial.158 This can result in additional 
 
 149 Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1993). 
 150 Id. at 13. 
 151 See Bellin, supra note 146, at 426 (analyzing anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that “juries 
punish defendants for remaining silent at trial with a ‘silence penalty’”); Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, 
Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don’t: Jurors’ Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a 
Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 60, 60–61 (2005) (discussing reasons why jurors are likely to draw adverse 
inferences from a defendant’s decision not to testify). 
 152 See Roberts, supra note 21, at 2018–30 (noting only Hawaii, Montana, and Kansas prohibit the 
impeachment of a defendant with his prior conviction). 
 153 See Bellin, supra note 146, at 401. 
 154 Id. at 401–02.  
 155 Id. at 407. 
 156 Babcock, supra note 149, at 3. 
 157 Nicole Oelrich Tupman & Jason Tupman, No Lie About It, The Perjury Sentencing Guidelines Must 
Change, 59 S.D. L. REV. 50, 50–51 (2014) (“Under the Perjury Guidelines, a judge can increase a defendant’s 
sentence by applying a cross reference to the Accessory After the Fact Guideline. This cross reference directs a 
judge to increase a defendant’s sentence where the underlying perjury was ‘in respect to’ an ‘underlying crime,’ 
typically resulting in a significant increase in prison time. The ‘underlying crime’ includes crimes of which a 
jury acquitted a defendant or crimes with which a defendant was never charged. . . . The Perjury Guidelines also 
violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by destroying the criminal jury’s important historical role because 
a judge may use uncharged or acquitted conduct to increase the sentence for a perjury violation.”). 
 158 Hon. Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial Judges 
to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 122–23 (2018) (explaining that a defendant may experience 
a “five-level swing” under the guidelines after losing at trial). 
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years in prison.159 Any good defense attorney advises her clients of these 
consequences of their testimony.160 
In addition to the legal frameworks that dissuade defendants from testifying, 
jury instructions also discourage defendants from testifying. Jurors are told that 
a defendant’s silence at trial cannot be considered by them in any adverse way.161 
Defense attorneys advise their clients that the judge will tell the jurors this 
fact.162 This could certainly allow a defendant to elect not to take the stand. The 
jury instructions offered when a defendant does choose to testify may also 
discourage testimony.163 
This effect of silencing the criminal defendant is troubling for a number of 
reasons. To the extent that the criminal trial is meant to be a quest to uncover the 
truth about whether a crime has been committed—keeping the one person who 
knows whether he committed a criminal offense off of the witness stand hinders 
that pursuit for justice.164 One scholar wrote, “[c]riminal defendants themselves 
are often a critical source of information about what happened.”165 When 
defendants testify, more crucial information gets to the fact finder. The ability 
of the witness to handle questions by the prosecutor on cross examination can 
also be illuminating.166 But when defendants choose not to testify, that 
opportunity is lost. 
While one may assume only guilty defendants choose not to testify—that is 
not the case. One survey found that 47% of defendants who were later 
exonerated by DNA evidence did not testify at trial.167 So, there can be little 
doubt that innocent defendants elect not to testify. In addition to the risks 
mentioned above, fear of public speaking, lack of sophistication or education, 
 
 159 Jeffery T. Ulmer, James Eisenstein & Brian D. Johnson, Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra-
Guidelines Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 584 (2010) (finding a 15% sentence-length 
difference between those who plead guilty versus those convicted after trial). 
 160 See 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (defining the acts and consequences of making false declarations before a grand 
jury or court). 
 161 See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (2009). 
 162 See id. at 1336. 
 163 See Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules That Encourage 
Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 876–77 (2008). 
 164 For more on this topic, see Sampsell-Jones, supra note 161, at 1331–35 and Bellin, supra note 161, at 
854–57. 
 165 Sampsell-Jones, supra note 161, at 1332. 
 166 Martin v. State, 346 A.2d 158, 160 (Del. 1975) (“Speaking generally, there is a wide discretion given 
to counsel during cross-examination as he tests, among other things, the credibility of a witness as well as his 
ability to observe, remember and relate.”). 
 167 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 
160 (2011). 
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and fear of a prosecutor twisting his words might dissuade a defendant from 
testifying.168 Jury instructions as they currently stand certainly do not encourage 
the innocent (or the guilty) to testify. 
This is worrisome for the integrity and reputation of the system. The fact that 
so many innocent people have been exonerated has eroded the public’s trust in 
the police, prosecutors, and judges.169 Popular media is brimming with true 
stories of flawed prosecutions that have led to disastrous results—When They 
See Us,170 Serial,171 Murder on a Sunday Morning,172 and Making a 
Murderer.173 The fact that innocent people do not trust the system only 
undermines the system more. Prosecutors and judges should want to play a role 
in a more equitable system and restore public confidence in that system. More 
defendants participating more fully in the system by testifying will also restore 
public trust.174 
The second reason that we should worry about silencing the criminal 
defendant is that criminal defendants tend to be disproportionately people of 
color, so their silencing has racial implications.175 Both implicit and explicit 
biases are at play when any witness testifies, but especially with respect to 
African American defendants.176 It is possible that the system discourages 
people of color from testifying because their stories are perceived as less 
important. When a judge presiding over a trial gives an instruction that puts 
emphasis on the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the case, it can reinforce 
stereotypes about guilt177 and give license to jurors to discriminate consciously 
or unconsciously. 
Further, police officers and police officer witnesses at trial are 
disproportionately white compared with the rest of the population.178 This 
 
 168 See id. at 160, 167–68. 
 169 Innocence Project, NACOLE (2016), https://www.nacole.org/innocence_project. 
 170 When They See Us (Netflix 2019). 
 171 Season One, SERIAL (2014), available at https://serialpodcast.org/season-one. 
 172 MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING (Docurama 2001). 
 173 Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015). 
 174 Sampsell-Jones, supra note 161, at 1329 (“[D]efendants’ own participation in the criminal 
process . . . would improve perceptions of legitimacy.”). 
 175 See Bellin, supra note 146, at 433. 
 176 See Goodman, supra note 142, at 4, 57. 
 177 See Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not 
Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190, 201 (2010) (showing that participants held 
implicit racial biases about how good or bad African Americans were perceived to be, and based judgments of 
guilt on these implicit determinations). 
 178 GOVERNING: THE FUTURE OF STATES & LOCALITIES, supra note 119. 
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discrepancy only further heightens the likelihood of the police officer being 
believed while the defendant is disbelieved.179 Jury instructions that undermine 
the defendant and instructions that prop up a police officer’s testimony should 
not further impair a defendant’s chances at trial. 
Judges decide which instructions to give in their courtrooms.180 And judges, 
like the rest of the legal community, are disproportionately white.181 Instructions 
can put the thumb on the scale, especially in a close case. We know that all-
white juries are more likely to convict Black defendants in criminal cases,182 so 
it is not far-fetched to imagine that trial judges are more likely to assume the 
guilt of Black defendants due to their implicit or explicit bias183 and to dole out 
instructions that hurt a defendant’s changes when the law allows the judge to do 
so. 
Finally, we should be concerned about silencing defendants because it 
contributes to mass incarceration. While it is impossible to prove that 
instructions like those at issue in this Article would dissuade a defendant from 
testifying, there is evidence that criminal defendants who testify are more likely 
to win at trial, especially if they do not have a prior conviction for a similar 
offense.184 With more favorable jury instructions, that number could rise. 
Americans who are worried about mass incarceration should want a fairer 
judicial system for defendants who elect to go to trial. And to the extent that our 
system of pleas is to blame for mass incarceration, trials in which a greater 
percentage of defendants prevail will encourage more defendants to go to trial 
and restore faith in criminal legal processes.185 Criminal jury instructions that 
highlight the defendant’s bias give defendants another reason not to testify at 
trial. 
 
 179 Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1378–80 (2018) (“For decades, our 
legal system has treated police officers as favored players, deferring to their judgments and reluctant to 
acknowledge their misconduct.”). 
 180 See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 55, at 77 (1988). 
 181 Moran, supra note 179, at 1378–79. 
 182 Johnson, supra note 25, at 415. 
 183 Levinson et al., supra note 177, at 197 (“The results of the study showed that, as in studies of the IAT 
in other populations, the judge participants displayed an implicit preference for White over Black. That is, 
participants were faster to group together photos of White faces with Good words compared to Black faces with 
Good words.”). 
 184 See Bellin, supra note 146, at 403–15 (citing mock jury studies and a mock experiment showing similar 
results). 
 185 See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 161, at 1335. 
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V. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM 
This problem with the jury instructions on credibility of defendants is further 
compounded by the fact that many jurors do not understand the instructions 
regarding the presumption of innocence. Jury instructions on the presumption of 
innocence do not ensure that the principles are enforced.186 
Many, if not all, jurisdictions presume that jurors—who swear an oath to 
apply the law as it is stated to them—follow the jury instructions.187 While the 
assumption that jurors can understand the instructions given to them is common, 
it is an inaccurate one. Jurors, of course, are lay people with varying levels of 
education and comprehension who tend not to have legal training.188 Jurors have 
a difficult time understanding the legal instructions given to them. Since 1970, 
studies consistently show that “most instructions cannot be understood by most 
jurors.”189 Despite 40 years of evidence, jury instructions and the manner in 
which they are delivered have changed very little. 
The most likely reason for the juror comprehension problem is that legal 
instructions are written above the comprehension level of most jurors. The 
 
 186 While apparently every jurisdiction has standardized instructions on the principles of the presumption 
of innocence, the burden of proof, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the language within the 
instructions varies between jurisdictions. Compare 1 DAVID E. AARONSEN, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 1.05 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining that “a reasonable doubt is a doubt founded 
upon reason. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires such proof as would convince you of the truth of a fact 
to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such belief without reservation in an important matter in your 
own business or personal affairs.”), with 1 BERGMAN, supra note 42, § 2.108 (“Reasonable doubt is the kind of 
doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver 
or more important matters in life. However, it is not an imaginary doubt, nor a doubt based on speculation or 
guesswork; it is a doubt based on reason. The government is not required to prove guilt beyond all doubt, or to 
a mathematical or scientific certainty. Its burden is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”), and 
MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.2 (2020) (“What is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt? The term is often used and probably pretty well understood, though it is not easily 
defined. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for everything in the 
lives of human beings is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. A charge is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt if, after you have compared and considered all of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true.”). 
 187 See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (finding that a death sentence should be upheld 
despite questions by the jury about legal instructions and where the judge responded to the questions using the 
same instruction); Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (“The jury is presumed to 
have followed these instructions . . . and this court will not ‘upset a verdict by assuming the jury declined to do 
so.’”); Hall v. United States, 171 F.2d 347, 349–50 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[J]urors should be presumed to have 
understood and followed the court’s instructions.”); Landay v. United States, 108 F.2d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 1939); 
Parmagini v. United States, 42 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1930). 
 188 See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 55, at 100. 
 189 Id. at 77. 
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average legal instruction is written at or above a twelfth-grade level,190 which 
significantly surpasses the average reading comprehension level of most adult 
Americans.191 Some even believe this figure to be declining.192 Further, 
considering that most legal instructions are delivered orally, the fact that 
listening comprehension may be even lower than reading comprehension should 
be yet another cause for concern.193 One legal observer has suggested that the 
jurors are like students studying for an exam when they are given legal 
instructions because they are learning topics previously foreign to them.194 
However, unlike students, jurors are never tested on their knowledge of any 
topic, limited in their ability to ask questions, and asked to absorb a large amount 
of information about complex topics in a relatively short period of time.195 
Jurors’ struggles with comprehending the law extend even to the core legal 
principles necessary to a fair criminal trial: the presumption of innocence and 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. One study showed that 50% of 
prospective jurors believed that it was the defendant who had to prove his 
innocence.196 That same study showed that 49.9% of people who had previous 
jury experience agreed that defendants had to prove their innocence.197 A 
Washington Post poll showed that 31% of people believed that if a person had 
been charged with a crime, he was probably guilty of at least some crime.198 In 
another poll, about 30% of people eligible for jury service in Miami and Atlanta 
thought that a person is probably guilty if the person is charged by the 
government and brought to trial.199 Even worse, more than 40% of people 
eligible for jury service in those two cities expected a defendant to prove his 
innocence despite a judge’s instructions on the matter.200 
 
 190 Rachel Small, Judith Platania & Brian Cutler, Assessing the Readability of Capital Pattern Jury 
Instructions, 25 JURY EXPERT 1, 1 (2013). 
 191 Id. 
 192 U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., ADULT LITERACY IN THE UNITED STATES, (2019), 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2019179. 
 193 See Small et al., supra note 190, at 5 (“[I]t’s likely that jurors would experience greater difficulty with 
listening comprehension compared to reading comprehension.”). 
 194 Dumas, supra note 50, at 714. 
 195 See id. at 712, 714, 731. 
 196 HEARST CORP., THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE MEDIA & THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 
ON PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 15 tbl.5D (1986). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Elissa Kraus, Improving Voir Dire Procedures, in JURYWORK SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES (2014) (citing 
Turner, Tabulation of Attitude Data on Criminal Justice Issues from a National Survey (June 1979) (unpublished 
manuscript)). 
 199 Id. § 2.7 fig.2.1. 
 200 Id. § 2.7 fig.2.2 (citing a National Jury Project poll from 2005). 
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There is also some evidence that jurors are unable to follow the instruction 
not to hold a defendant’s silence against him. In a small study of jurors who 
served in capital murder trials, the jurors generally “believed that the defendant’s 
silence inside the courtroom was a strong indication or an admission of guilt” 
after receiving instructions that a defendant’s silence could not be considered 
adversely.201 Defendants face jurors who are unable to understand a number of 
important legal principles. Courts should not undermine those principles further 
with instructions that unfairly highlight the factual issue of bias. 
VI. SOLUTIONS: NEW INSTRUCTIONS 
Few criminal defendants testify. Studies show that approximately half of the 
criminally accused decline to testify at trial or motions to suppress.202 There are 
many potential reasons for this—guilty defendants have little reason to testify 
truthfully at trial; their criminal convictions can be introduced as impeachment 
information in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia,203 and defendants 
are not supposed to receive any negative consequences if they do not testify.204 
Testifying at trial and being subjected to cross-examination by a skilled 
prosecutor whose aim is to discredit is not a welcome prospect to many people. 
A trial could easily be a person’s first instance of public speaking.205 
Prosecutors may not comment on a defendant’s silence and jurors are told 
not to hold it against him.206 Unfavorable jury instructions may be another 
reason that defendants choose not to testify. While it is ultimately the decision 
of the individual accused of the crime whether or not to testify, the defendant 
does so with the benefit of advice from counsel who will likely inform him of 
the many reasons not to testify so that the defendant can make an intelligent 
decision. 
Some scholars have argued for changing the legal rules to encourage more 
defendants to testify.207 Fact finders and the community would benefit from 
being able to hear from defendants, especially those from marginalized 
communities. The accused’s testimony could help the trier of fact understand the 
 
 201 Antonio & Arone, supra note 151, at 63. 
 202 Bellin, supra note 164, at 852. 
 203 See Roberts, supra note 21, at 1987. 
 204 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 205 See Babcock, supra note 149, at 12. 
 206 See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that judges must instruct jurors not to hold 
any adverse inferences against a defendant who does not testify). 
 207 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 164, at 897. 
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incident being considered.208 Affording the defendant better circumstances 
under which he could testify might also restore some perception of fairness in 
the criminal legal system by offering an opportunity for a different factual 
narrative.209 Hearing about an encounter between an officer and a citizen from 
the perspective of the citizen might appear to allow a different voice to be part 
of the criminal trial. Jurors might better understand what happened on the day in 
question as well as gain a new perspective on policing, or another community 
issues. 
To encourage people on trial to testify and to strengthen the jurors’ 
understanding of the presumption of innocence, I propose a new, standard 
“Defendant as Witness” instruction that could resolve these injustices: 
Mr. Defendant210 never had any duty to testify. This is because, as I’ve told 
you, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the government 
at all times and Mr. Defendant is presumed innocent. Mr. Defendant also has a 
right to testify on his own behalf. Mr. Defendant made the choice to testify in 
this case even though he did not have to. You should evaluate his testimony like 
that of any other witness except that in evaluating the testimony of Mr. 
Defendant, you should keep in mind that he is presumed innocent. You should 
not simply weigh his testimony against the government’s witnesses. The 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is much higher than that. You 
should consider Mr. Defendant’s testimony (and other defense witnesses) as 
reason to doubt the government’s case. 
An instruction like the one suggested above would guard against diminishing 
jurors’ understanding of the presumption of innocence and the government’s 
burden of proof. Further, it could help reinforce the critical legal principles upon 
which our system is built. A jury instruction like this could also help encourage 
testimony from more accused people and result in fairer trials in which we could 
all have more confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
While a new jury instruction will not completely solve the issue of silencing 
criminal defendants in their trials, it has the potential to make the criminal trials 
that do take place fairer. This improved instruction spotlights the presumption 
of innocence, the purported anchor of our criminal legal system. When an 
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accused person is actually seen as presumed innocent by the judge presiding 
over the trial, the jurors in that trial are more likely to see it that way. 
Allowing defendants to testify through an innocence frame requires changes 
to jury instructions. With a criminal legal system that incarcerates more people 
than any other place on earth, the goal should be more trials and more acquittals, 
not fewer. Abolition may be a worthy goal, but until we reach it, improving trials 
is worth doing now. If confidence is restored in trials, then more will take place. 
There is much to be undertaken in reforming our legal system and trials 
themselves should not be forgotten. 
Americans have excelled at incarceration. Our system is perceived as unjust 
and overly harsh by many. If we want to create a truly fair system and animate 
the principles in which we say that we believe, we will examine the criminal 
trial itself. Jury instructions are meant to help jurors understand legal principles, 
not factual ones. If we want criminal trials to be fair, we must give new 
instructions when the accused person testifies. This could encourage more 
defendants to testify—perhaps even more trials if the system is viewed as 
fairer—and it will ensure that jurors enjoy a deeper understanding of the 
presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 
 
